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Default Judgment was entered against the Defendant on August 
24, 1994. The trial court denied Defendant's Objection to Proposed 
Order (Default Judgment), Motion to Stay Entry of the Default 
Judgment and in the alternative Motion for Relief from Order and/or 
for a New Trial on September 22, 1994. (R. 235) A timely Notice 
of Appeal was filed on October 12, 1994. (R. 237) This court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(d). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in dismissing 
the Defendants1 Answer as sanctions for failure to comply with 
discovery given Defendant's inability to comply rather than wilful 
noncompliance? (R. 153 & 207). 
2. Did the trial court err in dismissing the Defendants1 
Counterclaim in view of the fact that no previous order gives any 
notice of such action and no opportunity for any hearing was 
afforded the Defendants prior to the court sua sponte striking 
such? (R. 195 & 208.)? 
3. Were the Defendants denied due process when the trial 
court failed to have the Plaintiff or itself transmit signed copies 
of either the order compelling discovery or judgment to the 
Defendants after entry as required by the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration? (R. 196 & 208-9)?1 
4. Did the trial court err in not requiring some type of 
evidentiary hearing and allowing the Plaintiff to incorporate into 
Did the Circuit Court's practice of falling to Issue Memorandum 
Decisions (simply notifying the parties by mailing highlighted copies of the 
court's Docket) comply with the Utah Code of Judicial Administration? 
1 
its judgment "just over $11,000" of the $13,515.58 in claimed 
damages of a third party who was barred from attempting further 
collection and the Plaintiff in this case was technically barred 
under the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion from 
including such in its damage claim? (R. 207-209) 
STATUTES 
The text of the Utah Code Ann. §§58-55-17, now §58-55-604, §4-
504 UCJA and Rule 4l(b) U.R.C.P. are contained in Appendix F. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Defendant James D. Craghead is the owner of a home located up 
Millcreek Canyon, Salt Lake County, Utah, (hereinafter "property") . 
Defendant Aspen Construction Co. and F. Lynn Padan, respectively, 
are the general contractor and the responsible licensee whom Mr. 
Craghead contracted with to do a significant remodeling of the 
property. 
Michael Mower is a subcontractor who contracted with Aspen to 
do the sheetrocking and related work in relationship to the 
remodelling. Mower in turn, subcontracted a portion of his 
sheetrocking job to Martin Bennett. Aspen and Mower are duly 
licensed general contractors. Bennett is not licensed. 
In late 1992, both Bennett and Mower filed mechanic liens 
against the property claiming $13,135.77 and $13,515.58, 
respectively. Craghead and Aspen disputed the liens and claimed an 
offset for damage to the premises when Mower and/or Bennett failed 
to cover certain beam work which had been previously painted and 
lacquered. The damage resulted in the beam work having to be 
completely refinished at a cost of between $3,900 - $4,500. 
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B. Course of Proceedings 
Both Bennett and Mower f i l ed separate mechanics l i ens against 
the property. Later, Bennett f i l ed su i t in the Dis tr ic t Court to 
foreclose h i s l i en , and Mower f i l ed su i t in Circuit Court to 
foreclose h i s l i e n . Mower moved in both the Circuit and Dis tr ic t 
Courts to consolidate the two cases. Before either court could 
address the propriety of consolidating the two cases, the Dis tr ic t 
Court granted the Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss the Bennett case 
pursuant to §58-55-17 U.C.A. and awarded attorney's fees of 
approximately $3,000 against Bennett pursuant to §38-1-18 Utah Code 
Ann. (1989) . (see Appendix A-l and A-2). 
Before addressing s ignif icant dates of the procedural history 
in the present case i t i s important to understand what information 
the P la int i f f had obtained from the two proceedings. 
The attorney for the Plaint i f f , Ms. Falk, also represented Mr. 
Mower in the Dis tr ic t Court case. Before the Dis tr ic t Court 
granted the Motion to Dismiss in the Bennett case the Defendant 
submitted s ignif icant discovery (see Appendix B) , including taking 
Mower's and Bennett's relationship was such that Mower issued Bennett 
a 1099 (not a W-2) and treated him as an independent contractor - not an 
employee. Bennett therefore sought his remedy independent of Mower rather than 
as an employee through the Industrial Commission. 
I . Significance of the Bennett Case Third District Court 93-
0904047CV. 
The Bennett proceeding (District Court) is important to this case because 
significant discovery was undertaken in the Bennett case, including depositions 
of Mower and Bennett, of which Plaintiff's counsel was aware. In order to 
analyze whether the Defendants were acting in good faith (whether the order 
striking the Answer and granting a Default Judgment as sanctions was 
appropriate), we would respectfully submit that the discovery undertaken in both 
proceedings must be reviewed since significant action took place in the Bennett 
case that is relevant to the present case. 
Additionally, of the $13,515.58 claimed by Mower, he clearly acknowledged 
that "just over $11,000.00" is due to Bennett's work, i.e., that only $2,500.00 
(approximate) is due to him separately as a markup or for materials. (See Mower 
deposition in District Court proceedings, page 26 lines 4-6 attached hereto as 
Appendix C.) 
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Mr. Bennett1s and Mr. Mower's depositions. (See Appendix B-4 and 
B-5.) This is important because the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the Bennett case were exactly the same facts and 
circumstances involved in the present case. Because counsel for 
the Plaintiff in the present case had in her possession significant 
discovery in the Bennett case she was privy to all the information 
obtained from the Bennett discovery, including the Bennett and 
Mower depositions. (This discovery is information the Circuit 
Court was never aware of.) The Appellants would respectfully 
request this court to keep this in mind when it determines whether 
the Plaintiff suffered any real prejudice due to the problems with 
the discovery in the present case. 
1. Procedural Timeline of Present Case 
With the discovery facts regarding the Bennett case in mind, 
let us now turn to the timeline of the case at issue. On January 
24, 1993, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in Circuit 
Court. On March 28, the Plaintiff submitted his first Request for 
Documents and Interrogatories. Among those Interrogatories were 
four (4) specific questions. 
Interrogatory No. 20: 
Identify the names and addresses of each and every 
individual or entity who supplied labor and materials or 
both to the project. 
The Defendants1 answer to Interrogatory No. 20 was: 
Object as being overly broad and not relating to any 
issue involved in this particular suit. In addition, 
such information is confidential as it presents a group 
of tradesmen available to the Defendant which gives him 
an economic edge. Without further clarification as to 
the relevance of this information these parties object as 
being overly broad and burdensome. In addition Mower, if 
he was on the job as much as he claims, would know much 
of this information. 
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Interrogatory No. 31: 
Identify all correspondence, contracts or any writing of 
any kind or description between and among the contractor, 
architect/engineer, subcontractors, material and 
equipment suppliers, the owner, field representatives, 
bonding and surety companies, consultants, or any other 
person, firm, or entity concerning or affecting the 
project. 
The Defendants1 answer to Interrogatory No. 31 was: 
Object as being overly broad and not related to issues 
relative to the mechanics lien foreclosure action and 
related offsets and counterclaims. If counsel for 
Plaintiff can provide the basis of why such a broad 
question needs to be addressed or what the scope or the 
extent of the work is leading to, we would be happy to 
reevaluate our answer; however, based on the foregoing 
and without waiving any objection I know of no 
correspondence, contracts, or writing of any kind with 
any subcontractor, material and equipment suppliers, 
field representatives, bonding and surety companies, 
consultants, or other persons, firms, or entity affecting 
the project. There was correspondence with the 
contractor and with such certain architect/engineers, 
however, to the extent such would lead to any 
discoverable information or are relevant in this case are 
highly questionable. 
Interrogatory No. 34: 
Identify all documents evidencing loans taken out by you 
of which any proceeds were used in connection with the 
project. Appellants answer was "In relationship to Aspen 
Construction and/or Lynn Padan: none." 
Interrogatory No. 36: 
"Identify all conversations or communications between you 
and the Plaintiff in connection with the project. 
The Defendants1 answer to Interrogatory No. 36 was: 
It is difficult at best to identify all conversations. 
If you can identify a particular topic I can attempt to 
answer with some degree of certainty, but with such a 
broad question it is difficult. 
A complete list of Interrogatories submitted by 
Plaintiff/Appellee is found in Appendix C-4 and C-5. Many 
5 
P l a i n t i f f ' s r e q u e s t for documents were e q u a l l y broad and v a g u e . 
•See Append i x (. I an I < ""•5. 
Between March 28 and May 17 t h e Defendants 1 c o u n s e l was u n a b l e 
t o o b t a i n h i s c l i e n t s 1 c o o p e r a t i o n a d e q u a t e l y respond t o t h e 
1! nioi" rocjat: "*•'— niniul Request 1 oi l)i 
On Ma; P l a i n t i f f f i l e d a Motion t o Compel D i s c o v e r y . And 
on June 1 J UHC t r i a l c o u r t judge e n t e r e d an Order Compel l ing 
D i s c o v e r y a s e v i d e n c e d by t h e r e c o r d . (1 78 . ) 
However, a s t h e m a i l i n g c e r t i f i c a t e w i l l i n d i c a t e t h e 
Defendants were never s e r v e d a copy nl 1" " : "'^ 11 mi l i s and 
t h e r e f o r e had no n o t i c e t h a t such an Order was a c t e v e r i s s u e d . 
See A f f i d a v i t of Joseph M. Chambers. (R. 7 9 . m a i l i n g c e r t i f i c a t e 
< > nt i]I i ii :te 9 1 9 9 Ii( • ::>ir I 
De fendants d i d answer P l a i n t i f f f s f i r s t s e t o f I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s 
on June ( w i t h i n t h e t imeframe of t h e Jun - 1994 , Order which 
% .our (4) 
I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s *. Defendants o b j e c t e d . ~ t h e 
remain ing I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s
 # Defendants f e l t t h e y , i n good f a i t h , had 
f i l e d complet nswers and compl ied w i t h P l a i n t i f f ""'s Request f o r 
Documents . 5 Howevere on J u l y 6, P l a i n t i f f f i l e d a Motion t o Compel 
answers t o t h e four (4) I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s and documents . 
The Defendants' attorney did not submit a response to the Motion because 
the reason the discovery was not answered was due to his clients not taking time 
to provide responses. Counsel felt submitting a reply under such circumstances 
would likely violate Rule 11 U.R.C.P. 
The responses submitted by the Defendants to the Plaintiff Mower's Request 
for Production of Documents were similar to Mower's response to the Defendants 
request in the Bennett case. Compare Appendix Qy^ and Appendix £- S 
C 
The language of Plaintiff%s Motion to Compel is crucial since 
the language of the Motion was much narrower than the language in 
the Order actually granted by the judge. 
The Plaintifffs Motion requested "that his motion to compel 
and for sanctions be granted and that he be awarded his fees and 
costs incurred in bringing this motion." (R. 109.) 
On July 8, two (2) days later, the Plaintiff deposed Mr. 
Padan. During this deposition Plaintiff was able to sufficiently 
clarify his discovery requests so that the Defendants could provide 
the documents that Plaintiff desired. Having finally understood 
what the Plaintiff was requesting, Mr. Padan agreed to provide the 
documents requested by July 15. (See Appendix C-8 pages 3-6.) 
The events that occurred during the Padan deposition are 
crucial in judging the intent of the Defendants. During the Padan 
deposition, the Plaintiff was able to clarify his discovery 
request. During the deposition all parties were able to establish 
a timetable to satisfy the discovery requests and during the 
deposition, Defendants were given the impression that Plaintiff had 
waived her Motion to Compel. (R. 161 paragraph 8 Padan Affidavit.) 
After the deposition, Mr. Padan went to work gathering the 
requested information from computer records at his office by 
pulling requested documents from his computer hard drive and other 
computer disks and compiling them onto a few computer disks that he 
could then transfer to Plaintiff. However, on July 13, Mr. Padanfs 
office was burglarized. (R. 164.) 
Quoting from the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office initial 
report, the police stated, "it has been determined that there are 
approximately three miniature computers, two desktop model 
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computers, one which was m xm r-ox a a box, one 
telephone, machine and other assorted office items to include 
personal disks, company disks preprogrammed disks." The 
report continued by stating: 
Kevin Monson reports that he left the business at 21:00 
hours on 7/13/94 and when he returned at 07:30 hours he 
found someone had pried the front door to the north, made 
entry into the business and removed the listed property. 
It was apparent that the suspects were intent on 
obtaining only computer equipment, because other items 
such as air staple gun and some other power tools had 
been passed by. 
Monson reports that it appears that each of the disks had 
been gone through, and in fact, in his office the small 
disks had been thumbed through and only certain disks 
removed. 
Among the disks and computer files taken during the burglary 
^ documents for 
the Plaintiff as well the disks containing the files had 
already compiled. 
Immediatel: Padan and Defendants1 counsel called 
Plaintiff's counsel, Ms. Falk. Numerous calls were made and 
messages left, both with Ms. Falk • ..:i: ig ser v :i < ::e a,,i u I, I: .hi : < : i lgh 
her secretary, However, she did eturn any of the calls to Mr. 
Padan or Mr. Chambers. At this time defense counsel was suffering 
from pneumonia and was unable \o practic:*'. lai » To? ,i pariod of time. 
(R. ir •'> Affidavit -T hambers.) (This ;he reason for Mr. Padan 
attempting to contact Plaintifffs counsel directly.) 
Because Ms, FYJ I Ilk a ml Mi, Chambers had in ill, in " '- n fiblo to 
communicate concerning the burglary, on July Plaintiff fs 
counsel filed a Motion to Submit for Decision her July 6 Motion to 
C granted Plaintiff1s 
Motioi i ) 
o 
It is not so important that the court granted the Motion; but 
rather, it is the scope of the trial courts Order that is 
significant. The Plaintiff's Motion to Compel only asked for: 
compelled discovery, sanctions, and fees. (R. 109.) However, in 
the trial courtfs docketing statement the court mentioned for the 
first time the language, "the Defendant is to respond within twenty 
(20) days or the answer is stricken and judgment entered." (R. 
148.) This language was not in the Motion to Compel nor was 
Plaintiff sent a copy of the internal disposition summary included 
in the court docket. 
Only after August 4 did Plaintifffs counsel respond for the 
first time to the numerous messages left by the Defendant and 
Defendant's counsel regarding the burglary. In the fax, counsel 
refers to the Order granted by the trial court on July 27 and 
states that the defense must respond fully within twenty (20) or 
the judgment against them would be granted pursuant to the Order 
issued by the judge on the 27th of July. See Appendix D. 
Additionally, counsel for the Plaintiff was unwilling to grant any 
leeway due to the burglary or the medical problems of defense 
counsel. As the fax shows, she was simply unwilling to work with 
Defendants nor was she willing to accommodate the practical 
impossibility of complying with discovery because of the burglary. 
A few days later, on August 8 counsel for the defense sent a 
letter to Plaintiff's counsel, including an Affidavit documenting 
his medical problems. (Appendix E) In this letter, defense 
counsel accused Plaintifffs counsel of intentionally attempting to 
stay ignorant of the facts of the case, of her failure to return 
the numerous messages left by both Mr. Padan and defense counsel, 
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and her knowledge and a reminder that not until the Padan 
depot 11 1 mi hi 1
 r II thril tin* "nil I iciently clarified the scope of 
her discovery that would allow the Defendants to comply. 
Instead of responding to the letterf Plaintiff filed a Motion 
dgment < August v>ased Defendant f «= 
failure comply with the August Order Compel. It 
important to be aware that Plaintiff's Motion 
w»c! s fi led oniv if teen (15) days after the trial court signed the 
Order which gave Defendants twenty (20) days comply. The 
Defendants feel they have complied w i t:,h dill I he 
to the full extent of their ability do so. 
C. Disposition in Trial Court 
against the 
Defendants for over $18,000, (R 189.) However, the Defendants 
were only mailed an unsigned copy of the judgment back on August 19 
I io judgment. Appellants repeat 
they never received a copy signed judgment no mailing 
certificate by a clerk or counsel states such ;r 
e11Ir\ b) <" 1'hie court-. 
On August 26, the Defendants filed an Objection e 
Proposed Order (Default Judgment) ind Request I Slay -f 
Judgment and in the Alternative Motion for Relief from Judgment and 
for a lew Trial. On September ,. trial court denied the 
Defendants Motion if 
Appeal and this case now stands before this court be addressed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
<iiv»Mi I llhii' t ut <JI I 11 y nl l i t e n n j < most t i n c e s , w l i e i e l i t e D e f e n d a n t s 
had answered a s i g n i f i c a n t amount of the discovery submitted and 
because of a burglary were unable to produce the remainder of 
certain documents, it was an abuse of discretion to strike the 
Answer and a substantial Default Judgment against the Defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CIRCUIT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE 
DEFENDANTS1 ANSWER AS SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 
DISCOVERY GIVEN DEFENDANTS1 INABILITY TO COMPLY RATHER THAN 
WILLFUL NONCOMPLIANCE. 
A. A Default Judgment Is the "Capital Punishment" of All 
Sanctions and Should be Used Only as a Last Resort When 
Other Less Stringent Sanctions Would be Ineffective. 
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure outlines the 
numerous sanctions available to a trial court when a party fails to 
cooperate with discovery. The Rule requires the court to issue 
sanctions that "are just." It then outlines specific sanctions. 
Such sanctions range from staying the proceedings until the order 
is obeyed, to contempt charges. However, all would agree that the 
"capital punishment" of all sanctions described in Rule 37 is the 
"dismissing [of] the action or proceeding or any part thereof, [or] 
rendering a default judgment." Utah. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (1994). 
In Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunlev. 396 P.2d 401 (Utah 1964), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated, "[w]e recognize that granting of a 
judgment against a party solely for disobeying an order to 
cooperate in discovery procedure is a stringent measure which 
should be employed with caution and restraint and only where the 
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failure has been willful and the interest of justice so demand." 
I l L <»'• ,lLl l«"" 
The Tucker court went on to caution the lower court that, 
11
 [ E ] xcept aggravated cases, serious sanctions 
app] :i eci to accomplish the desired results, 
particularly where there Is any likelihood injustice by 
depriving a party of a meritorious cause of defen&p." id. 
B. The Discretion of the Trial Court Must Comport with 
Reason and Justice and Should Resolve Doubts in Favor of 
Permitting Parties to Have Their Dav in Court on the 
Merits of the Controversy. 
The standard c review for this issue is abuse discretion. 
When revi e wi ng , • have 
given trial courts considerable latitude. However, as the Supreme 
Court noted Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601 (1976), (after 
[T]his [discretion] does not mean that the court has 
unrestrained power to act in an arbitrary manner. 
Fundamental to the concept of the rule of law is the 
principle that reason and justice shall prevail over the 
arbitrary and uncontrolled will of any one person; and 
that this applies to all men in every status: to courts 
and judges, as well as to autocrats or bureaucrats. The 
meaning of the term 'discretion1 itself imports that the 
action should be taken within reason and good conscience 
in the interest of protecting the rights of both parties 
and serving the ends of justice. 
Id. at 603. 
After reviewing the reasons Defendants were unable to comply 
with the twenty (20) day limit, the Appellant invites this court to 
ask itself whether ordering Judgment aqaimJ. II v iMSl'endant s was: 
(1) employed with caution and restraint and only where the failure 
has been willful and the interests of justice so demand; (2) issued 
cm h< rif i P I i le t eriii i n in iiKi II i< iiof oiKlrinf ?,'" ,trf m n s c o n s i i t u t e d » very 
aggravated case; (3) imposed only after determining less serious 
12 
sanctions could not accomplish the desired results; (3) unlikely to 
cause injustice or deprive the Defendants of a meritorious defense; 
or, (4) imposed after determining that the Defendants1 failure to 
comply within the twenty (20) day limit had been willful? 
If this Court answers no to such questions, then the Appellant 
submits the trial courtfs decision was not "taken with reason and 
good conscience and in the interest of protecting the rights of 
both parties and serving the ends of justice11 And if such is the 
case, this Court should find that the trial court did abuse its 
discretion. 
C. Because of the July 13th Burglary, Defendants1 Failure to 
Comply was Due to Inability Rather than Willful 
Noncompliance, thus Striking the Defendants1 Answer and 
Counterclaim Awarding Judgment for Plaintiff was an Abuse 
of Discretion. 
The trial court issued Judgment for Plaintiff on August 24 
solely because the Defendants supposedly failed to comply with the 
twenty (20) day timeframe stated in the August 4 Order compelling 
discovery. It is therefore essential to focus on the Defendants1 
violation of the twenty (20) day timeframe in order to determine 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Judgment. 
The trial court's August 4 Order compelling discovery stated: 
"Plaintiff's Motion to compel is granted. Defendants are 
to provide their response to Plaintifffs within 20 days 
or Defendants1 answer will be deemed stricken and 
j udgment entered." (R. 109.) 
Twenty (20) days after this Order was issued, the trial court 
entered a Judgment against the Defendants. The Judgment stated: 
"the Court ordered defendants to produce the requested discovery by 
no later than 20 days from the date of the Court's ruling, or 
judgment will be entered in favor of the Plaintiff." (R. 148.) As 
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the twenty (20) days was to commence seems to have caused 
some i counsel filed her Motion for Entry 
Judgment on August 19—only fifteen (15) days after the trial court 
signed the Order which gave Defendant twenty (20) days I t iiif I , 
^ompel. The trial court waited until August 24 
before signing the Entry of Judgment, twenty (20) days after 
signing the August 4 Order to Compel. However
 l( in, or d o I 
Defendants a fill1 twenty (20) days to comply with the Order 
Compel, the trial court should have signed the Judgment w** w,uC 
morning UJ. Uie 25th of August. 
Notwithstanding the problem above, the issue before this court 
is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted 
Judgment for I tin lJ 1 w \ irit i f 1 ber/ciii:ie supposedly failed 
to comply with the Order within twenty (20) days. 
Appellants submit that the Jul y 13th burglary of M~ s 
office mad* it impossible for Defendants to comply with the trial 
court's Order within the twenty (20) day limit. The police report 
from the Salt Lake County Sherifffs office Kites: 
At this time, it has been determined that there are 
approximately three Miniature [sic] computers . . . . One 
telephone, a Fax machine and other assorted office items, 
to include personal disks, company disks, and pre 
programmed disks. Estimated loss at this time is thirty 
thousand dollars ($30,000). (Police report, see R. 
164) . 
The police report narrative commented that: 
It was apparent that the suspects were intent on 
obtaining only computer equipment, because other items 
such as air staple gun and some other power tools, had 
been passed by. 
Monson reports that it appears that each of the 
desks had been gone through, and in fact, in this office 
the small disks had been thumbed through and only certain 
disks removed. (See R. 164)• 
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In Arnica Mut. Ins, Co, v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 962 (Utah 
App. 1989) This court reasoned: 
Imposing [default] sanctions for a partyfs refusal to 
respond to a court order compelling discovery is a harsh 
sanction and therefore, requires "a showing of 
•willfulness, bad faith, or fault1 on the part of the 
non-complying party. " "Willful failure" has been 
defined as "'any intentional failure as distinguished 
from involuntary noncompliance." 
In Arnica, the Defendant asserted that the only basis for 
sanctions was his failure to produce personal tax returns, and such 
failure was not willful but due to inability. In response, this 
Court held: "Schettler1s position is not supported by the record. 
It is clear from the trial court's order that failure to produce 
personal tax returns was not the only reason for entering 
Schettler1s default. Furthermore, Schettler failed to demonstrate 
. . . that his failure to produce the tax return was due to 
inability." Id. at 962. 
Unlike the facts in Arnica, it is clear from the trial courtfs 
order that Defendants1 failure to produce the requested discovery 
within the twenty (20) day time limit was the reason the trial 
court granted judgment for the Plaintiff. (R. 164.) 
Moreover, from the sheriff's report, Mr. Padan's Affidavit (R. 
160), and Mr. Chambers1 Affidavit (R. 155 and 160), the Defendants 
in the present case have demonstrated that their failure to comply 
with discovery within the twenty (20) days was due to inability. 
(Citing Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 684 P.2d at 1266 (quoting Soclete 
Internationale v. Rogers. 357 U.S. 197, 78 S. Ct. 1087, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958))). 
8
 (Citing M.E.N. Co. v. Control Fluldlcs, Inc.. 834, F. 2d 869, 872-73 
(10th Clr. 1987)). 
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Mr. Padanfs Affidavit established that "documentation which 
[he] had spent several hours pulling together, was taken along with 
all [his] office equipment.11 (See R. 161). The S.L.C. sheriff's 
report establishes there was in fact a burglary of Mr. Padan1s 
office and that many computers and computer files were stolen. (R. 
164.) 
Immediately after the burglary, Mr. Padan states "[he had] 
attempted to contact Attorney FaIk with respect to these matters 
but [had] not made contact at this time, having left messages and 
her in turn attempting to return calls to me [him]." (R. 161.) 
Pursuant to the trial courtfs August 4 Order, the Defendants 
had through August 24 to comply with discovery. Eleven (11) days 
prior to that deadline, a burglary of Mr. Padan1 s office made it 
impossible to comply with the court's twenty (20) day limit. 
Defendants, in good faith, attempted to contact Plaintifffs 
counsel and inform her of the burglary and discuss alternatives. 
Without possession of the necessary documentation, Defendants1 
failure to comply was involuntary rather than willful or an 
intentional failure to comply. Given this court's language in 
Arnica, the trial court abused its discretion when it entered 
Judgment against Defendants. 
To put the level of noncompliance in perspective, Defendants 
had already responded to thirty-five (35) of the thirty-nine (39) 
Interrogatories and had provided many documents. The Defendant 
Padan, the contract, or had been deposed and had stipulated to have 
his deposition continued to another date. This is not a case where 
the Defendants were not cooperating—there was significant 
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compliance. The whole issue of noncompliance is over four (4) 
broad Interrogatories and some stolen documents. 
When speaking on the abuse of discretion standard as it 
relates to upholding or reversing sanctions imposed by the trial 
court, the Utah Supreme Court stated: Hit has always been the 
policy of our law to resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties 
to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy." Carman 
v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601,603 (Utah 1976). 
The merits of the Defendants1 case are especially compelling. 
Of the $13,515.58 sought for in Plaintiff's Complaint, the 
Plaintiff himself admits that "just over 11,000.00" is attributable 
to a claim the District Court dismissed in a sister proceeding to 
this action. (Mower deposition in District Court proceeding, page 
26 lines 4-6). Additionally, Defendants can document a $3,900 -
4,500 offset due to damage Plaintiff caused to varnished beam work 
giving rise to his $13,515.58 claim against Defendants. 
To deny Defendants the opportunity to present their case 
solely because a burglary made it impossible for Defendants to 
respond to four (4) Interrogatories and produce documents within 
the twenty (20) day time limit, is not within the spirit or intent 
of Rule 30. 
The Supreme Court has addressed similar issues and resolved 
the problem by giving the parties a day in court. In Carman. the 
Defendant did not appear at a scheduled deposition and failed to 
produce the requested documents. The trial court ordered the 
Defendants1 answer stricken and his default entered because "there 
did not appear in the record any justification for [the 
Defendants1] failure to appear at the deposition and produce the 
17 
documents" Id. at 602. However, the Supreme Court held that under 
the circumstances shown, the striking of defendant's . 
pleadings and entering judgment against [defendant] was an abuse of 
discretion; and the interest of justice will be best served by 
vacating that order and remanding the case for trial.11 Id. at 603. 
Appellants respectfully submit the circumstance in the present 
case compels this Court to allow the Defendants their day in court. 
II. THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE DEFENDANTS1 
COUNTERCLAIM IN VIEW OF THE FACTS THAT NO PREVIOUS ORDER GIVES 
ANY DEFENDANT NOTICE OF SUCH AUTHORITY AND NO OPPORTUNITY FOR 
ANY HEARING WAS AFFORDED THE DEFENDANTS PRIOR TO THE COURT SUA 
SPONTE STRIKING THEIR ANSWER. 
This appeal involves two Orders, neither of which gave 
Defendants notice that the court would strike their Answer or that 
their Counterclaim would be dismissed. Plaintiff first submitted 
an Order compelling discovery May 17, 1994. On June 9, 1994, the 
trial court granted that Order. However, Plaintiff failed to mail 
a copy of the signed Order to Defendants1 counsel. The Certificate 
of Service on the signed Order states that a true and correct copy 
of the above Order was mailed to the Defendants1 counsel on May, 
17, 1994—23 days before the judge signed and issued the Order. 
Defendants were never given notice of this Order when it was 
signed, and were therefore unable to govern themselves in 
accordance with it. Nevertheless, Defendants did respond to 
Plaintiff's discovery requests in good faith and gave what they 
felt were complete answers given the vagueness of Plaintiff's 
request. 
Apparently, Plaintiff was unhappy with certain answers and 
filed a second Motion to Compel answers to the four (4) 
Interrogatories and for sanctions on July 6, 1994, (See Appendix C-
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6 and C-7, R. 109) .9 This is the Motion that lead to the trial 
court's order granting Judgment for Plaintiff. In this Motion, the 
Plaintiff only requested "that this Motion to Compel and for 
Sanctions be granted and he [Plaintiff] be awarded his fees and 
costs incurred in bringing the Motion." (See R. 109-10.) 
Plaintiff's supporting Memorandum requests only that the Court: 
[E]nter an order requiring defendants to respond to 
plaintiff's discovery requests, to produce the documents 
forthwith, to award plaintiff reasonable costs and 
attorney's fees incurred by plaintiff in bringing this 
Motion to Compel dated May 17, 1994, and for Sanctions." 
R. 114. 
Plaintiff made no suggestion that the court strike Defendants' 
answer and grant Judgment for Plaintiff. 
Two days after Plaintiff filed this Motion to Compel, the 
Plaintiff deposed Mr. Padan. At this deposition, counsel for 
Plaintiff clarified and narrowed her Request for Documents and 
Interrogatories—resolving the problem which lead to the July 6 
Motion. At the deposition, both parties agreed that Defendants 
would provide Plaintiff with the needed information by July 15. 
(Appendix C-8). 
Mr. Padan spent many hours during the next days copying 
documents from company computers and various floppy disks in an 
effort to comply with Plaintiff's request (See Padan Affidavit, R. 
160) . However, two (2) days before the documents were due, 
Defendants' office was burglarized, and all the primary files as 
well as the compiled copies to be turned over to Plaintiff were 
stolen. Both Mr. Chambers and Mr. Padan left several messages with 
9 
Counsel for the Defendants was equally dissatisfied with the Plaintiff's 
response to their discovery (letter dated ^OS'UJJ3>'J.> ^ ) but had not yet sought 
a Motion to Compel. See Appendix C-3 « 
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Plaintiffs counsel informing her of the burglary. However, she 
did not return any of the messages. Instead, Plaintiff filed a 
Notice to Submit for Decision, on Plaintifffs July 6 Motion to 
Compel and for Sanctions. 
On July 26, the trial court, without a hearing, granted 
Plaintiff's Motion. The court's only record of its judgment is 
recorded in the Courts internal docket entry. In the Comments 
section of this docket entry, the language regarding the twenty 
(20) day timetable appeared for the first time. The Defendants had 
no notice of this language. The mailing certificate in the August 
4 Order states that Defendants were mailed a copy of the proposed 
Order on August 2, only two (2) days before Judge McCleve signed 
the Order. 
Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration states: 
Copies of all proposed findings judgments, and orders 
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being 
presented to the court for signature unless the court 
otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be 
submitted to the court and counsel within five days after 
service. 
The purpose of 4-504(2) is to give opposing counsel an 
opportunity to challenge a proposed order. However, having mailed 
a proposed Order from Salt Lake City two (2) days before the Court 
signs the Order denied Defendants of any practical opportunity to 
object to the Order. The Circuit Court did receive Defendants' 
objection to the proposed order on August 8 (giving Defendants six 
(6) days for the Order to come from S.L.C. to Logan, have 
Defendants draft a motion in opposition, and then mail that back to 
S.L.C). However, the objection was of no avail, the Order had 
already been signed four (4) days earlier. 
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If Defendants had been given notice of the first Order 
compelling discovery or if they had been given notice of a proposed 
twenty (20) day limit, and given more than two (2) days to respond, 
Defendants would have responded more forcefully and extensively. 
In short, Plaintiff would have responded to the Motion in the same 
manner and with the same evidence they offered in their Objection 
to Order Granting Attorney's Fees and Motion for Relief from Order. 
(See R. 150.) 
In Cornish Town v. Roller, 798 P.2d 753 (1990), the Utah 
Supreme Court addressed the notice required for motions filed 
pursuant to Rule 4-501(1), the very rule applicable to Plaintiff's 
Motion to Compel and Judgment. The Supreme Court in Cornish held: 
Rule 4-501 assures timely notice of the nature of 
proceedings against a party. In Nelson v. Jacobson, we 
stated, 'Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to 
be heard in a meaningful way are the very heart of 
procedural fairness.' In Nelson we further noted: 'Many 
cases have held that where notice is ambiguous or 
inadequate to inform a party of the nature of the 
proceeding against him or not given sufficiency in 
advance of the proceeding to permit preparation, a party 
is deprived of due process.' 
Because Defendants were without notice of either the first 
Order compelling discovery or the twenty (20) day timeframe, the 
urgency and significance of Plaintiff's July 6 Motion was all but 
absent. However, if Defendants had been given proper notice of 
either fact, then they would have opposed the Motion with the same 
vigor and evidence they exhibited in their Objection to Order 
Granting Attorney's Fees and Motion for Relief from Order. The 
difference would have been, that the Defendants would not have had 
to overcome the presumptions in Rule 60(b). 
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Defendants were twice denied proper notice by Plaintiff. Each 
created a great prejudice against the Defendants1 case. Thus, 
Defendants pray for a vacating of the trial courtfs Judgment, which 
was based solely on the twenty (20) day time limit, and remand to 
the trial court for a trial on the merits of the case. 
III. THE PLAINTIFFfS FAILURE TO TRANSMIT COPIES OF THE SIGNED ORDER 
COMPELLING DISCOVERY AND JUDGMENT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE UTAH 
CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
A. Standard of Review 
This court in Hartford Leasing v. State of Utah, 255 Adv. Rep. 
52 (1994) stated, "[a] trial courtfs interpretation of a rule in 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration presents a question of law 
reviewed for correctness." 
The trial court dismissed Defendants1 Answer and entered 
Judgment for the Plaintiff based on an Order compelling discovery 
signed August 4, 1994. Whether that Order complied with Rule 4-
504(4) is a question of law. Thus, the standard of review is de 
novo. 
B. Neither the Order Compelling Discovery nor the Judgment 
were Transmitted to Defendants after Judge McCleve's 
Signature. 
Rule 4-504(4) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
states: 
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall 
be served upon the opposing party, and proof of service 
shall be filed with the court. All judgments . . . are 
to be transmitted after signature of the judge, 
(Emphasis added.) 
The trial courtfs order: granting Plaintifffs Motion to 
Compel, requiring Defendants to comply with said order within 
twenty (20) days, and awarding Plaintiff $200 in attorneys fees, 
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was signed and dated by Judge Sheila K. McCleve on August 4, 1994. 
(R. 148.) However, the Orderfs Certificate of Service states that 
a true and correct copy of the above Order was mailed to 
Defendants1 counsel on August 2, 1994; only two (2) days before 
Judge McCleve signed the Order. 
The Judgment, dismissing Defendants1 Answer and entering 
Judgment for Plaintiff was signed August 24, 1994. However, the 
Mailing Certificate shows Defendants were mailed a copy on August 
19—five (5) days before the judge signed the Judgment. 
Defendants have never received a signed copy of either the 
Order compelling discovery, the Judgment for Plaintiff, nor a 
Notice of Entry of Judgment. This case presents the problem Rule 
4-504(4) was designed to prevent. 
Again in Hartford, this court held, "[i]n interpreting a 
statute or rule, we examine its fplain language and resort to other 
methods . . . only if the language is ambiguous." Id. at 55 
(citations omitted). 
The language of Rule 4-504(4) is clear. All judgments are to 
be transmitted to opposing parties after being signed by the judge. 
The trial courtfs August 4 Order was transmitted two (2) days 
before it was signed by Judge McCleve. The record is absent of any 
other evidence that either the August 4 Order or the August 24 
Judgment were ever transmitted to the Defendants after Judge 
McCleve signed them. The procedures of Rule 4-504(4), which ensure 
due process, were not followed. Such a breach constitutes error by 
the trial court, requiring the Judgment entered against the 
Defendants vacated and the case remanded for trial. 
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IV. UNDER THE DOCTRINES OF CLAIM PRECLUSION AND ISSUE PRECLUSION, 
THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN NOT BARRING PLAINTIFF FROM 
RECOVERING "JUST OVER $11,000" OF THE $13,515.58 IN CLAIMED 
DAMAGES UNDER THE DOCTRINES OF CLAIM PRECLUSION AND ISSUE 
PRECLUSION. 
A. Standard of Review 
Res Judicata is a question of law requiring a de novo standard 
of review. 
B. The District Court Dismissed Mr. Bennettfs Claim Against 
Defendants Pursuant to Section 58-55-17. now Section 58-
55-604 of the Utah Code, because Mr. Bennett was an 
Unlicensed Contractor. 
In order to establish the connection between the present case 
and the case of Bennett v. James B. Craghead, F. Lynn Padan et.al 
Civ. No. 940904047CV it is necessary to briefly outline the 
relevant facts. 
Beginning in March of 1992, Mr. Mower was hired as a licensed 
subcontractor to provide certain sheetrocking labor and supplies 
for the remodeling of the Craghead home. In turn, Mr. Mower 
contracted with Mr. Bennett (an unlicensed contractor) as an 
independent contractor to provide much of actual sheetrocking labor 
and supplies. The work was completed in August of 1992. Mr. Mower 
and Mr. Bennett claimed their services totalled $31,874.53. Mr. 
Craghead and Mr. Padan background certain payments due Mr. Mower 
and Or. Bennett claiming they damaged the interior of the home. 
Mr. Mower and Mr. Bennett filed separate liens against the property 
in the amount of $13,515.58 and $13,135.77. 
Then, in 1993, both Mr. Mower and Mr. Bennett commenced 
separate actions to foreclose on their respective mechanics liens. 
Mr. Mower filed in Circuit Court and Mr. Bennett filed in District 
Court. 
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Discovery was commenced in both cases. As part of discovery, 
Padan's counsel deposed Mr. Mower. Mr. Mower stated at his 
deposition that "just over $11,000.00" of his $13,515.58 claim was 
due to Bennett's work, i.e., only $2,500 (approximate) is due him 
separately as a markup for the materials. (See Mower deposition in 
District Court proceedings, page 26 lines 4-6. Appendix B-5.) 
Discovery in the Bennett case disclosed that Mr. Bennett was 
not a licensed contractor, contrary to what Mr. Mower and Mr. 
Bennett led Defendants to believe during construction. In response 
to this information, Defendants filed a motion seeking dismissal of 
Mr. Bennett's case pursuant to §58-55-17 U.C.A. (now §58-55-604), 
which prohibits unlicensed contractors from commencing or 
maintaining an action for collection of compensation for performing 
any act for which a license was required. The District Court 
granted the motion and dismissed Mr. Bennett's mechanic's lien 
claim for $13,135.77. (See Appendix A-l). 
C. Dismissal of the Bennett Case Precludes Plaintiff in the 
Present Case from Recovering Just Over $11.000" of the 
$13.515.58 in Claimed Damages under the Doctrines of 
Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion. 
Based on the District Court's dismissal of the Mower claim, 
Plaintiff should have been precluded from recovery "just over 
$11,000" of his $13,515.58 claim which, by Plaintiff's own 
admission, is due to work done by Mr. Bennett. 
The Supreme Court of Utah defined issue preclusion and claim 
preclusion in Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care, 766 P.2d 1059 
(Utah 1988) . The court first discussed the two doctrines. It then 
went on to define a "claim" and an "issue." The court held "an 
issue" may be described as a "certain and material point, affirmed 
25 
by one party and denied by the other. • . No relief is inherent in 
the resolution of an issue" Id, at 1061 (citations omitted). 
The court then held lfa claim or cause of action11 is 'the 
aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a right enforceable 
in the courts1. . . . A claim is the 'situation or state of facts 
which entitles a party to sustain an action and gives him the right 
to seek judicial interference in his behalf.1" Id. (citations 
omitted). 
The dismissal of Mr. Bennettfs case could be defined as an 
issue in the present case because, whether or not Mr. Mower can 
recover $11,000.00 from the Defendants which was in fact owed to 
Bennett (when Bennett cannot maintain an action for that same 
$11,000.00) is a material point at issue in the present case. 
However, this same scenario could also be described as an aggregate 
set of operative facts which give or deny the Plaintifffs claim to 
"just over $11,000.00" of the $13,515.58 prayed for in his 
Complaint. Given this ambiguity, Defendants will apply the facts 
to the elements of both issue and claim preclusion. 
1. Issue Preclusion 
The Swainston court set forth the elements of issue 
preclusion. They are: 
1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical 
with the one presented in the action in question? 
2. Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party 
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication? 
4. Was the issue in the first case competently, fully, and 
fairly litigated? Id^ _ at 1061. 
The issue in the Bennett case and the present case are 
identical. It is "Can the Defendants be held liable to pay for 
work done by an unlicensed contractor?" 
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In either the Bennett or Mower case, the fact remains, that at 
all times, the Defendants would only hire licensed contractors and 
at all times, Mower assured the Defendants that he was hiring only 
licensed subcontractors. However, Mower hired an unlicensed 
contractor—Bennett. As a result, significant damage was done to 
Mr. Craghead's home. This is the very harm §58-55-604 was designed 
to prevent. The Defendants1 liability for work done by Bennett was 
the sole question in the Bennett case. And as for $11,000.00 of 
Mowers $13,515.58 claim, it is the sole question in this case. 
This issue was already decided in Bennett v. Cracrhead, et al. The 
first element is clearly established. 
The District Court's dismissal of the Bennett case was final. 
Rule 41(b) of Utah R. of Civ. Proc. states: 
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any 
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue 
or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits. 
The District Court dismissed the Bennett claim based on §58-
55-17, now §58-55-604. That dismissal was final and based upon the 
merits. The second element is clearly established. 
Mr. Bennett and Mr. Mower were also in privity with one 
another in regards to their claims against Defendants. Each claim 
arises out of one separate construction agreement between Mr. Mower 
and the Defendants. There was no agreement between the Defendants 
and Bennett. Of Mowerfs $13,515.58 claim, he admits over 
$11,000.00 is due to Bennettfs work. All parties in this action 
(Circuit Court) were also parties in the District Court action. 
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The elements having been met, Mower is precluded from claiming 
the $11,000.00 due to work done by Bennett, an unlicensed 
contractor. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above the Defendants respectfully 
requests this court order the Circuit Court to vacate the Default 
Judgment and reinstate Defendants1 Answer and Counterclaim and 
enter an order that under the circumstances the Defendants did not 
willfully fail to answer the discovery and that barred thereon the 
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